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"Undercover Teachers" Beware:
How that Fake Profile on
Facebook Could Land You
in the Pokey
by Paul F. ("Pete") Wellborn III*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A.

"Undercover Teachers" on the Internet
Depending upon whom one asks, it is either: (1) the dirty little secret
of American educators; (2) an effective tool for safeguarding the wellbeing of students and ensuring their compliance with both governing law
and school policy; or (3) an overblown myth that rarely, if ever, actually
occurs. "It" is the establishment and use by teachers and academic
administrators of "undercover profiles" on social networking websites
like Facebook' or MySpace,2 pursuant to which the educator poses as
a peer of the educator's teenage or college age students. When the
educator's fictitious persona is "friended," or otherwise added, by a given
student to that student's network of online insiders, the educator has an
unadulterated view into the life of the monitored student. Due in large
part to the false sense of security that arises from the student's ability
to define and limit his circle of digital friends, the student's communications on the social networking website are often unguarded and
unfiltered. It is not unusual for statements and pictures posted by a

* Founding and Managing Member, Wellborn, Wallace & Woodard, LLC, Atlanta,
Georgia. Georgia Institute of Technology (B.S., 1986); Mercer University, Walter F. George
School of Law (J.D., 1989). Member, State Bar of Georgia. Any opinions or viewpoints
expressed in this Article represent those of the Author only.
1. FACEBOOK, http:i/www.facebook.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
2. MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
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teenage or young adult user to include irrefutable evidence of conduct
that violates his school's code of student conduct or, in some cases,
constitutes an outright criminal violation.
B.

Social Networking Websites
A social networking website allows its users to create personal profiles
or pages and interact with other website members. This category of
websites includes Internet destinations like Facebook, MySpace,
Twitter,' and YouTube,4 to name a few. Typically, a social networking
website includes content that is available to any visitor to the website
and content that is available only to members.' A social networking
website member typically has the ability to designate the various
portions of his personal profile, page, or other personal section of the
website as public (meaning that it is available to all website visitors) or
private (meaning that it is available only to those website members
specially approved by the subject member).' Although the account setup process for most social networking websites is free for the prospective
member, the member must nonetheless accept and comply with the
governing website user agreement.' Most social networking websites
require, among other conditions of becoming a member (that is, of
becoming an "authorized user" of the website), that the registering
member provide accurate information during the sign-up process."
The leading social networking website and, indeed, the most visited
website in the world is Facebook? There are more than 800 million
unique Facebook users worldwide, and on any given day, over 400
A substantial
million unique users access the Facebook website"
number ofAmerican Facebook users-roughly 65 million-are between the
ages of thirteen and twenty-five years old.n For good or bad, the daily

3. TwirrER, http://twitter.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
4. YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
5. See, e.g., MYSPACE, supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., Sharing and Finding You on Facebook, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.
com/about/privacy/your-info-on-fb#control (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
7. See, e.g., Statement ofRights and Responsibilities,FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.
com/terms.php (last visited Nov. 25, 2011).
8. See, e.g., id. § 4.
9. Daniel lonescu, Google Names Facebook Most Visited Site, PCWORLD.COM (May 28,
2010,6:29AM),http://www.pcworld.com/article/197431/google-names-facebookmost-visit
ed site.html.
10. Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited
Oct. 11, 2011).
11. Ken Burbary, FacebookDemographicsRevisited-2011 Statistics,WEB BUSINESS BY
KEN BURBARY (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.kenburbary.com/2011/03/facebook-demograph
icsrevisited-2011-statistics-2/.
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use of social networking websites has become a ubiquitous part of
student life for middle school, high school, and college students across
the United States.
C. Crime and Punishment: IncriminatingEvidence on Social
Networking Websites
1. Witness for the Prosecution? An Alleged Wrongdoer's Own
Social Networking Website Pages. Although details as to how the
incriminating evidence is discovered are often murky, media reports of
students hoisted with their own social networking website petards are
appearing with increasing frequency. In Pearl, Mississippi, a high
school student was removed from the cheerleading squad after her coach
read e-mails sent via the student's Facebook account, to which the
cheerleading coach required access pursuant to the squad policy.12 At
a high school in Fairfax, Virginia, campus police monitor student social
networking accounts to glean information on the students' gang
membership and criminal activities." In Wisconsin, at the University
of Madison-Lacrosse, campus police charged a number of underage
drinkers on the basis of social networking website photographs showing
the students' illegal use of alcohol.14 The authorities there were able
to access the incriminating pictures on the basis of an undercover social
networking website-based investigation."
The dean of St. John's
College in Cambridge, England, reportedly posed as "Pedro Amigo" to
investigate an offensive comment made by a student in a social
networking website group called "St John's Has Banned Us Taking Wine
to Hall."" After a student recognized the e-mail address associated
with the Pedro Amigo account as actually belonging to the dean, the
dean made a hasty and embarrassing retreat and deleted the account.1 7
In Tennessee, a mother's Facebook posting about the mess her two
football-playing sons made of their rooms each weekend led to the
discovery that her sons did not satisfy the district residency requirement

12. Marquita Brown, Pearl District Sued Over Alleged Facebook Incident, CLARIONLEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), July 29, 2009.
13. Michael Birnbaum, Campus Officers Cruise Facebook, MySpace for Clues to SchoolRelated Crimes, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 6425763.
14. Bryan McKenzie, Column, DAILY PROGRESS (Charlottesville, Va.), Aug. 6, 2011,
available at 2011 WLNR 15586553.
15. Id.
16. Caroline Gammell et al., Cambridge Dean Joins Facebook to Monitor Students,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (United Kingdom), Oct. 29, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 20594078.
17. Id.
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for the high school they attended.'8 As a result, the two boys were
declared ineligible and three of their school's football victories were
vacated." Three students at Chapel Hill Middle School in Atlanta,
Georgia, were suspended for violation of school policy in relation to
Facebook postings in which they referred to a teacher they disliked as
a mentally-ill rapist and pedophile.2 0 Students at Jonathan Dayton
High School in Springfield, New Jersey, were punished for Facebook
comments construed by school officials as being racist.2' In Lake
County, Illinois, school district authorities unanimously implemented a
policy requiring that all students participating in extracurricular
activities, including sports, fine arts, and other clubs, sign a pledge
acknowledging that any online evidence of "illegal or inappropriate"
behavior, including postings and pictures on social networking websites,
would be grounds for discipline.2 2 A sports media company recently
unveiled a computer program called "YouDiligence," designed to monitor
student-athletes' social networking website accounts for incriminating
or inappropriate posts.2 3 Finally, in Texas, a Burleson High School
eleventh grader was suspended for allegedly profane content on her
MySpace account.24 A complete account of all instances of social
network-related discipline meted out at high schools and colleges would
fill volumes. As social networking website use by high school and college
students continues to skyrocket, these incidents will no doubt continue
to occur with ever-increasing frequency.
2. Student/Parent Reactions and Educator Liability. Schoolrelated discipline arising from comments or pictures appearing on a

18. Tenn. Mom's Facebook Post Costs Sons' FootballTeam 3 Victories, CITIZENS TIMES
(Asheville, N.C.), Sept. 27, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 19828384.
19. Id.

20. Ty Tagami, Student: Principal Forced Deletion of Facebook Posts, ATLANTA J.
CONST. (Mar. 3, 2011, 5:53 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/student-principal-forced-deletion-

858326.html; see also Ty Tagami, No Expulsion ForKids' Facebook Posts About Teacher,
ATLANTA J. CONST. (Mar. 10, 2011, 5:09 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/no-expulsion-forkids-867892.html.

21. Brett Biebelberg, School Officials Crack Down on Student-CreatedFacebook Group,
SPRINGFIELD PATCH (Mar. 1, 2010), http://springfield.patch.com/articles/school-officialscrack-down-on-student-created-facebook-group.

22. Changes Affect Student Posting Online, CHICAGO TRIB., May 23, 2006, availableat
2006 WLNR 8890519 (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Dave Copeland, Keep it Clean Kids, Software's Watching, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 19,
2009, available at 2009 WLNR 1034021.

24. Shirley Jinkins, Burleson School Officials Remove Girl's Demerits, Drill Team
Suspension, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Aug. 12, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR
15607259.
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student's social networking website account is often met with opposition
and outrage by the involved students, their parents, their peers, and, in
extreme circumstances, results in legal action on behalf of the disciplined
students.2 5 Almost without exception, media accounts of these incidents include comments from irate parents and students who believe
that the school overstepped its bounds, overreacted, violated the
student's right to freedom of speech, or otherwise acted inappropriately. 2 6 An educator whose investigation includes the use of a social
networking website account through which the educator has posed as a
peer of the disciplined student, however, could face a much graver
consequence-criminal prosecution and jail time. A colorable argument
exists that an educator's creation and use of such accounts constitutes
a violation of state and federal criminal law, subjecting the involved
educator-in a worst-case scenario-to fines or jail time, or both.27
The basis for the educator's potential criminal culpability arises from
the right of a social networking website owner to define the mandatory
rules with which all users of its website must comply." The terms of
service that set forth the agreement between a social networking website
and a user-to which the user must expressly assent as a condition of
account set-up and website use-typically require, among other provisions, that the user provide true and correct information during the
account creation process.29 By so responding, by otherwise complying

25. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 12 (lawsuit for $50 million filed by parents of girl
suspended from cheerleading squad for profanity in a Facebook posting); Tagami, No
Expulsion For Kids' Facebook Posts About Teacher, supra note 20 (allegations that school

violated the involved student's privacy); Wendy N. Davis, No More Pencils, No More
Facebooks, 95 A.B.A. J. 18 (July 2009) (student who was disciplined for a parody MySpace
he created of his school principal successfully sued the school for violation of his First
Amendment rights); see generally Christi Cassel, Keep Out ofMySpace! ProtectingStudents
from UnconstitutionalSuspensions and Expulsions, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643 (2007).
26. See sources cited supra note 25.

27. See discussion infra Part II.A. Although beyond the scope of this Article, the
theories underlying criminal culpability for the creation and use of bogus website profiles
by educators arguably apply with equal force to the use of "undercover accounts" by private
investigators and the creation of parody accounts by students and others that purport to
belong to the parody subject. See, e.g., Shirin Chahal, Balancing the Scales of Justice:
Undercover Investigations on Social Networking Sites, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
285 (2011); Kevin P. Brady, Student-CreatedFake Online ProfilesUsing Social Networking
Websites: Protected Online Speech Parodiesor Defamation?, 244 ED. L. REV. 907 (2009);
Bradley Kay, Extending Tort Liability to Creatorsof Fake Profiles on Social Networking
Websites, 10 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2010).

28. See discussion infra Part II.A.
29. As of October 2011, MySpace's "Terms of Use Agreement" requires that the user
"represent and warrant that (a) all registration information ... submitited] is truthful and
accurate; [and that (b) [the user! will maintain the accuracy of such information . . . ."
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with the governing provisions of the website user agreement, and by
promising continued compliance, the new member becomes an authorized user of the social networking website." Conversely, if a new
member gains access to the website via the intentional provision of false
information or otherwise breaches the governing terms of the website
user agreement, that member's access to and use of the website is not
authorized." In the latter instance, the resulting impermissible access
to and use of the website arguably gives rise to a number of viable
criminal charges against the unauthorized user. These criminal charges
range from state laws prohibiting criminal trespass to federal
laws-including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) 3 2-that
generally prohibit unauthorized computer access.
D. Purpose of this Article
This Article does not advocate the prosecution of educators who
establish and use social networking website accounts in the manner
described above, nor does it offer any opinion regarding the propriety or
ethics of such investigations. This Article also does not address the
constitutionality of any discipline or punishment arising from the
students' social networking website comments or postings. Rather, the
Author's primary intent-indeed, his sole intent-is that this Article serve
as a warning of the worst-case consequences to any educators who,
unaware of the grave legal implications, might otherwise continue to use
social networking website accounts in the undercover manner described
above to monitor or investigate their students. This Article examines
the relevant legal theories and surveys the issues and authorities
pertinent to the prosecution and defense of any such charges.

Terms of Use Agreement, MYSPACE.COM http://www.myspace.com/Help/Terms, § 1 (last
visited Oct. 11, 2011). The Facebook "Statement of Rights and Responsibilities" prohibits
Facebook users from "providlingl any false personal information on Facebook, or creatling]
an account for anyone other than [themselves] without permission." FACEBOOK, supra note
7,

§ 4.
30. See, e.g., FACEBOOK, supra note 7, § 4.
31.

See, e.g., id.

32. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). The CFAA was enacted in 1984 as an
anti-hacking statute. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of
1984 (CFAA), Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 2102, 98 Stat. 1837, 2190 (1984) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 1030). It has been amended numerous times, with each amendment
broadening the statute's scope. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030. Subject to certain additional
conditions, the CFAA prohibits unauthorized access to a computer and access to a computer
in excess of the access actually granted. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a).
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THE LAW

A. Criminal Culpabilityfor the Establishmentand Use of Undercover Accounts
The analysis of a website user's liability for unauthorized access to the
website, or access in excess of the authorization actually given, begins
with acknowledgement of a computer owner's personal property interest
in that computer. Courts have repeatedly ruled that all rights in and to
the computer-including the right to access and use that computer from
a remote location or via the Internet-lie with the computer owner.3 3
The owner has the right to determine both who is allowed to access or
use the computer and the scope of any limitations or rules governing
that access or use.34 Accordingly, not unlike that same owner's house
or car, the owner's computer can be trespassed upon, unlawfully
accessed, or otherwise misused by a third party in such manner as to
give rise to viable criminal charges, civil causes of action, or both. It is
important to note, however, that authorization to access or use a
computer is not an "all or nothing" proposition. Even if a person is
authorized to access or use some element or part of a computer or
computer network, access or use of non-authorized parts of that same
network may nonetheless give rise to a criminal charge or cause of
action."
The body of authority pertaining to computer access-related liability
has grown in leaps and bounds over the past fifteen years, as the
Internet has gone from an academic curiosity to a ubiquitous part of
daily life for roughly eighty percent of United States households."

33. See, e.g., Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., No. C-98 JW PVT ENE, C98-20064
JW, 1998 WL 388389, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp.
2d 548, 550 (E.D. Va. 1998); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450-51
(E.D. Va. 1998); CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015,1027 (S.D.
Ohio 1997).
34. See sources cited supra note 33.
35. See Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d
1121, 1124-25 (W.D. Wash. 2000). In Shurgard, the court found that the plaintiff stated
a justiciable claim under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in relation to the defendant
employees, who, in excess of the actual authorization they had in relation to their employer's computer, accessed the plaintiffs proprietary information and sent it to a competitor
while still employed by the plaintiff. Id. at 1123.
36. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, as of October 2009, nearly eighty percent of
households in the United States included one or more people who accessed or otherwise
used the Internet. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Internet Use in the United States: October 2009,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/computer/publications/2009.html (follow "Table 1. Reported
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Many of these authorities address the CFAA, computer trespass, and
similar causes of action in the context of unauthorized use by senders of
unsolicited commercial e-mail (spam) of private computer networks
belonging to various Internet service providers (ISPs), all of whose
policies forbade such use. Virtually without exception, courts considering spam-related cases have ruled that the plaintiff ISP (the owner of
the computer network at issue) has the right to establish the rules
governing third-party use of the ISP's computers, and that thirdparties-the defendant spammers-who access or use the network in
derogation of those rules unlawfully trespass upon the network and
violate, among other prohibitions, the CFAA.
For example, in Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc.," the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California ruled that
the defendant spammers' access to and use of the plaintiff ISP's mail
servers in violation of Hotmail's terms of service constituted, among
other causes of action, violation of the CFAA and trespass upon
Hotmail's computer network.39 Likewise, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in America Online, Inc. v.
IMS, 40 granted summary judgment to the plaintiff ISP on, among other
counts, its cause of action for trespass to chattels against the defendant
spammer." Like the terms of service agreement in Hotmail,4 2 America Online's (AOL's) terms of service prohibited the sending of spam
through the AOL network, thereby rendering the spammers' use of the
AOL network unauthorized.13 AOL won another anti-spam victory in
America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc.,4 a case in which the court found
that the defendant spammers trespassed upon AOL's computer network
and violated the CFAA in relation to the spammers' unauthorized use of
AOL's computer network to send spam.45 Finally, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio in CompuServe, Inc. v.
Cyber Promotions, Inc.,"6 granted a preliminary injunction against the
defendant spammers in favor of the plaintiff ISP, rejecting the defen-

Internet Usage for Households" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
38. No. C-98 JW PVT ENE, C 98-20064 JW, 1998 WL 388389 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
39. Id. at *6-7.
40. 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998).
41. Id. at 551.
42. See Hotmail, 1998 WL 388389, at *1-2.
43. See Am. Online, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d at 550.
44. 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998).
45. Id. at 450-51.
46. 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
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dants' First Amendment" defense and finding that the defendants had
trespassed upon AOL's computer network."
Because a website is, in fact, a collection of data and information
housed on a server (a type of computer) and available via the Internet,
the website and the server or servers upon which it resides are protected
in exactly the same manner as were the e-mail networks in the spamrelated cases cited immediately above. For example, in Multiven, Inc.
v. Cisco Systems, Inc.," the Northern District of California found that
the plaintiffs former employee was liable to the plaintiff under the
CFAA for his unauthorized access to the plaintiff's website.so Likewise,
the Southern District of Ohio in Jedson Engineering, Inc. v. Spirit
ConstructionServices, Inc.," ruled that the plaintiff did indeed present
a colorable cause of action in relation to its claim of unauthorized access
to its website by the defendant.52 In Snap-On Business Solutions, Inc.
v. O'Neil & Associates, Inc.," the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio found that, in relation to the defendant's
unauthorized access to and use of the plaintiff's website, the plaintiff's
computer trespass claim and its CFAA claim presented justiciable issues
of fact."
Finally, in Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., the
Northern District of California found that the defendant violated the
CFAA by marketing software that allowed users to make automated
postings to the website, to scrape the website to gather user e-mail
addresses, and to circumvent security measures built into the website,
all in violation of the website's terms of service."
As these cases demonstrate, courts generally are not reluctant-in a
civil setting-to enforce a website owner's terms of service against website
users who violate those terms (that is, against "unauthorized users").
The same is not true, however, in a criminal setting. As explained in
detail below at Part II.B, the primary obstacle to the imposition of
criminal culpability for unauthorized or excessive access to a website
arises from a perception-or misperception, depending upon one's point
ofview-that governmental enforcement of owner-drafted terms of service
would represent an impermissible delegation of law-making authority to

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
CompuServe, Inc., 962 F. Supp. at 1026-28.
725 F. Supp. 2d 887 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
Id. at 895.
720 F. Supp. 2d 904 (S.D. Ohio 2010).
Id. at 926-27.
708 F. Supp. 2d 669 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
Id. at 678, 680.
694 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
Id. at 1048-50, 1056-57.
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the website owner. This judicial concern, however, is arguably misplaced
because virtually all criminal laws that pertain in any way to violation
by one person of another's personal or real property rights include some
element of owner-defined authorization or consent.57
For example, section 16-7-21 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(O.C.G.A.)" defines Georgia's law of criminal trespass in terms of
property damage, interference, or entry "without consent" or "without
Georgia's Computer Crimes statuteso
authority" of the owner.s"
defines Georgia's prohibition against computer theft, computer trespass,
computer invasion of privacy, and computer password disclosure in
terms of further-defined, prohibited acts undertaken "without authority."6 1 O.C.G.A. § 16-7-2312 defines the offense of "criminal damage to
property in the second degree" in terms of damage to the property of
another "without his consent."' Likewise, Georgia's burglary statute" requires, among other wrongful acts, the wrongdoer's entry or
continuing presence within a dwelling "without authority'6
In relation to each of these criminal statutes, the prosecution of a
defendant necessarily includes examination and application of any
consent, limited authority, or other such license or permission that the
complaining party may have given to the defendant. Conceptually, the
idea of a computer or website owner defining the scope of authorities
that ultimately determine who is and is not an "authorized user" is
indistinct from a real property owner defining the scope of the licenses
that ultimately determine who is and is not a trespasser. Accordingly,
across the board application of a prohibition against the prosecution of
any criminal charges that rely in whole or in part upon the scope of the
license granted to third parties by a computer owner (that is, upon
"private rules") would gut the CFAA in its entirety. The rights of use
and access, or the lack thereof, in relation to any given computer,
network, or website are necessarily defined by the owner and, accordingly, are at issue in every CFAA-related case.

57. Georgia law is used herein to illustrate the permeation of owner-defined rights and
licenses in virtually all statutes that protect the owner's property interests. The law of
Georgia in this area is generally unremarkable and is substantially similar to corresponding protections enacted in other states.
58. O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21 (2011).
59. Id. § 16-7-21(a)-(b).
60. Id. § 16-9-93 (2011).
61. Id.
62. Id. § 16-7-23 (2011).
63. Id. § 1 6-7-23(aXl).
64. Id. § 16-7-1 (2011).
65. Id. § 16-7-1(a).
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B. No Criminal Culpability for the Establishmentand Use of
UndercoverAccounts
The argument against criminal culpability for the establishment and
use of undercover social networking website accounts was set forth in
expansive detail in an opinion arising from a polarizing matter that
dominated headlines across the country-the prosecution of Lori Drew
(Drew) in relation to the tragic death of thirteen-year-old Megan Meier
(Megan)." In September 2006, Drew was a forty-seven-year-old female
living in O'Fallon, Missouri." Drew's daughter Sarah was the former
The once-close friendship
classmate of their neighbor Megan."
between Sarah and Megan had, for whatever reason, chilled when
Megan changed schools." On or about September 20, 2006, Drew and
others (the conspirators) accessed the MySpace social networking site
and set up a bogus profile for a fictitious sixteen-year-old boy they
named "Josh Evans."o Drew posted a picture purporting to be Josh
that was, in fact, a picture of an uninvolved teenage boy who had no
knowledge of the use of his likeness. Posing as Josh, Drew and the
conspirators struck up an online flirtation with Megan that soon
blossomed into a digital romance via the exchange of many messages via
MySpace.n On or about October 15, 2006, the messages from Josh
suddenly turned mean and insulting, culminating with an October 16,
2006 message in which Josh told Megan that "the world would be a
better place without her in it."72 Immediately thereafter, apparently
inconsolable over Josh's comments, Megan committed suicide by hanging
herself with a belt. Upon learning of Megan's suicide, Drew deleted
the "Josh Evans" MySpace account and directed a teenage neighbor with
knowledge of the scheme to "keep her mouth shut."0
After Drew's plot was uncovered, the matter ignited a media firestorm.
Drew was charged with, among other crimes, violation of the CFAA
under the theory that her access to and use of the MySpace website was
unauthorized because of her intentional violation of the MySpace terms

66. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
67. Id. at 452; Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned FatalDrawsAnger But No Charges,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/us/28hoax.html.
68. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452.
69. Maag, supra note 67.
70. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452.
71.

Id.

72.
73.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Maag, supra note 67.
Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452; Maag, supra note 67.

74.

Maag, supra note 67.
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and conditions." Ultimately, Drew was found guilty of "accessing a
computer involved in interstate or foreign communication without
authorization or in excess of authorization to obtain information in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1030(a)(2XC) and
(cX2)(A), a misdemeanor."7 1 On appeal, the United States District
Court for the Central District of California deemed the central appellate
question to be "whether a computer user's intentional violation of one or
more provisions in an Internet website's terms of service (where those
terms condition access to and/or use of the website's services upon
agreement to and compliance with the terms) satisfies the first element
of section 1030(aX2)(C)."" Forecasting its ultimate holding, the court
noted that "[ilf the answer to that question is 'yes,' then seemingly, any
and every conscious violation of that website's terms of service will
constitute a CFAA misdemeanor.""
The court found that the second and third elements of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(aX2)(C) 7 9-the obtaining of information from a protected computer and the involvement of an interstate or foreign communication-are
necessarily present anytime an Internet user contacts, communicates
with, or accesses a website.' This left, as the pivotal issue, the first
element of § 1030(aX2(C)-whether there occurred the intentional access
of a computer without authorization or in excess of the authorization
actually granted." In the context of Drew's alleged violations, the
court reiterated as the "primary question" the issue of "whether any
conscious violation of an Internet website's terms of service" would
necessarily constitute access "without authorization or exceeding
authorization."82
The court first explained that, in a civil (as opposed to criminal)
setting, "most courts that have considered the issue have held that a
conscious violation of a website's terms of service/use will render the
access unauthorized and/or cause it to exceed authorization," citing a
long list of supporting cases.' The court reiterated that

75. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 451.
76. Id. at 453 (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id. at 457.
78. Id.
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2XC) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
80. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 457-58. The second element is no longer a requirement as the
2008 amendment to the CFAA struck that provision. Id. at 458 n.14; see also Identity
Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-326, § 203, 122 Stat. 3560,
3561 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030).
81. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 458.
82. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. Id. at 460.
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It cannot be considered a stretch of the law to hold that the owner of
an Internet website has the right to establish the extent to (and the
conditions under) which members of the public will be allowed access
to information, services and/or applications which are available on the
website.... Nor can it be doubted that the owner can relay and
impose those limitations/restrictions/conditions by means of written
notice such as terms of service or use provisions placed on the home
page of the website. ... While issues might be raised in particular
cases as to the sufficiency of the notice and/or sufficiency of the user's
assent to the terms, . .. and while public policy considerations might
in turn limit enforcement of particular restrictions, . . . the vast

majority of the courts (that have considered the issue) have held that
a website's terms of service/use can define what is (and/or is not)
authorized access vis-a-vis that website."
Despite concluding that MySpace did indeed have the right to define
the limits of "authorized access" to its website, the court then undertook
an analysis of Drew's conviction under the void-for-vagueness doctrine." The court characterized the key vagueness-related issue as
"whether basing a CFAA misdemeanor violation as per 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1030(a)(2)(C) and 1030(c)(2)(A) upon the conscious violation of a
website's terms of service runs afoul of the void-for-vagueness doctrine."86
The court commenced its vagueness analysis by reference to Justice
Holmes's explanation of the "fair warning" requirement:
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text
of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair
warning should be given to the world in language that the common
world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line
is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should
be clear."

Citing United States v. Lanier," the court then noted three scenarios
in which the fair warning doctrine would bar enforcement of a criminal
statute: (1) situations in which the forbidden or required acts are "so
vague" that reasonable men would have to guess at the meaning and
might differ as to the effect; (2) situations in which the "strict construction" rule would require limitation of the statute's scope to conduct

84. Id. at
85. Id. at
86. Id. at
87. Id. at

461-62 (citations omitted).
462-68.
464.
462-63 (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
88. 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997).
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clearly covered by the statute; and (3) situations in which a court uses
a "novel construction" to extend the statute to conduct for which neither
the statute itself nor construing cases have given any forecast of
coverage.89
The court next explained that, as applied to any of these three
situations, the void-for-vagueness doctrine embodies two "prongs" or
requirements: (1) a "definitional/notice sufficiency requirement" pursuant
to which the challenged statute must sufficiently describe the prohibited
conduct to ensure fair notice to the public and to eliminate the possibility of arbitrary enforcement; and (2) a "minimal guideline[]" requirement
pursuant to which the legislature must have crafted the law in such
manner as to eliminate the possibility of "a standardless sweep [that]
allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal
predilections.""
The court reiterated that, to survive a void-for-vagueness challenge,
a "criminal statute must contain 'relatively clear guidelines as to
prohibited conduct' and provide 'objective criteria' to evaluate whether
a crime has been committed."'
In its analysis, the court offered several rationales to support its
ultimate finding that Drew's conviction was barred by the void-forvagueness doctrine:
* that Drew's misdeeds on the MySpace site were, in fact, mere
breaches of contract that did not involve criminal violations;9 2
* that, because MySpace does not charge any fee in relation to
the establishment of user profiles, it was not damaged by Drew's
unauthorized access;93
* that the owner of a website is, in effect, "darned if he does
and darned if he doesn't" because any effort to characterize only
certain user agreement violations as unauthorized access would be
too vague and any effort to characterize all such violations as
constituting unauthorized access would be overbroad;94
* that criminal liability for terms-of-service violations impermissibly allows a website owner to define what conduct is criminal;95 and
89. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 463 (quoting Lanier, 520 U.S. at 266) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
90. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58
(1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id. (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 149 (2007)).
92. Id. at 464.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 464-65.
95. Id. at 465.
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* that MySpace's terms-of-service define authorized access in
terms of the user's promise to abide by those terms, rather than the
user's actual compliance with the terms."
In further support of its ultimate holding that Drew's prosecution was
barred by the vagueness doctrine, the court then-somewhat curiously-undertook a discussion best characterized as "everyone else is doing
it, so why can't Drew?"" The court cited, as examples of other users
potentially breaching the MySpace/user agreement (other "unauthorized
users"), lonely hearts who lie about their age and appearance, users who
post photographs of their friends, and parents who use their respective
accounts to help their daughters sell girl scout cookies." The court also
noted that thirteen-year-old Megan herself was in violation of the
MySpace Terms of Service, which required that users be at least
fourteen years old." These various justifications are, to say the least,
less than compelling."oo
In relation to the "minimal guideline" requirement, citing United
States v. Sablan,o' the Government argued that the CFAA's scienter
requirement is satisfied when the user intends to violate the governing
terms of service, thereby overcoming any vagueness-related challenge.1 02 The court rejected the Government's position on the basis of

96. Id.
97. See id. at 466.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. The finding that Drew's misdeeds were mere breaches of contract represents a
virtual Sword of Damocles that threatens every future prosecution under the CFAA. In
any criminal cases involving unauthorized access or access in excess of the permission
actually granted, if there exists any contract between the complaining party and the accused-whether in the context of employer-employee, owner-contractor, or any other such
relationships-the table is set for the Drew argument: "Aw, shucks, your honor, this is
nothing more than a breach of contract case." The court's reliance on the fact that the
establishment of MySpace did not entail any cost or fee is similarly meritless. MySpace,
like Facebook, is a for-profit company whose primary asset is its universe of members and
whose primary income source-advertising-depends in substantial part upon the accuracy
of the user information maintained by the company. Finally, the court's "everyone else is
doing it" discussion is especially specious. The substance of this reasoning is that violation
of a website terms of service can never give rise to criminal charges because so many users
commit minor violations (for example, the lonely heart who lies about his age or the user
who posts unauthorized pictures). Taken to its logical conclusion, states would have to
cease enforcement of speeding laws on some stretches of interstate highways because
virtually every driver exceeds the speed limit and because some violations are less
egregious than others (that is, enforcement of a 65 mph speed-limit nets both the driver
who is going 66 mph and the driver going 96 mph).
101. 92 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 1996).
102. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 467.
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three arguably meaningless distinctions between Sablan and the facts
underlying Drew's prosecution:
(1) Sablan involved access to a
computer, while Drew accessed a website server; (2) the mens rea issue
in Sablan, although also involving the CFAA, did not involve the
vagueness doctrine; and (3) Sablan was a felony case that involved a
different subsection of the CFAA. 1 o3
The court instead ultimately held the following:
Treating a violation of a website's terms of service, without more, to
be sufficient to constitute "intentionally access ling) a computer without
authorization or exceedling] authorized access" would result in transforming section 1030(a)(2)(C) into an overwhelmingly overbroad
enactment that would convert a multitude of otherwise innocent
Internet users into misdemeanant criminals ....
In sum, if any conscious breach of a website's terms of service is held
to be sufficient by itself to constitute intentionally accessing a computer
without authorization or in excess of authorization, the result will be
that section 1030(a)(2)(C) becomes a law "that affords too much
discretion to the police and too little notice to citizens who wish to use
the [Internet]."a

III.

CONCLUSION

A common mistake made by first-year law students and other nonlawyers is to ask, in relation to a given hypothetical fact pattern, "Can
you sue?" when, in fact, they mean, "Does a colorable cause of action
exist?" and "How likely is it that a lawsuit would be successful?" For
decades, law school professors have responded to their students' question
with an old axiom that highlights the inherent error in the students'
formulation: "You can sue the Bishop of Boston for bastardy-you just
won't win." This old saw underscores the extraordinarily low barrier for
the commencement of a lawsuit in the United States legal system. As
a result, even in cases best characterized as frivolous-cases that the
plaintiff should never have filed-far too often, the only true winners are
the attorneys collecting the fees from their respective clients. Accordingly, except in cases involving exigent or unusual circumstances, the
prudent attorney sets a course for his client that minimizes the
likelihood of his client being sued, rather than a course that merely
increases the likelihood of winning some inevitable lawsuit.

103. Id.
104. Id. at 466-67 (alterations in original) (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S.
41, 64 (1999)).
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The educator considering whether to commence the use of, or continue
to use, bogus social networking website accounts in the manner
described herein should plot a similarly prudent course. The educator's
guiding question should not be, "If I am charged or sued, would I
prevail?" Rather, the "undercover educator" must understand that, even
in the best possible circumstances and jurisdiction, he is still only a
zealous prosecutor, an angry, influential parent, or a bad set of
underlying facts away from becoming a criminal defendant. The
educator should recognize that the undercover use of these accounts is,
legally speaking, a bad idea."o' The prudent decision therefore mandates the educator's immediate cessation of any undercover social
networking website activities. There are enough challenges already to
being an educator without adding the threat of jail time to the list.

105. Interestingly, there may exist reasons wholly unrelated to the threat of criminal
prosecution that make the use of "undercover accounts" a bad idea. In an effort to
minimize the likelihood of inappropriate communications or activities between teachers and
students, a growing number of jurisdictions are implementing outright bans on social
networking website "friend" relationships between teachers and students. Missouri
Revised Statute § 162.069, a part of the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act, Mo. S.B. 54,
Reg. Sess., 2011 Mo. Laws 1151, prohibited teachers and students from being "friends" on
any social networking websites that allowed the possibility of private communications
between the two. Mo. S.B. 54, 2011 Mo. Laws at 1161 (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 162.069). The statute was almost immediately declared unconstitutional in Missouri
State Teachers Ass'n v. State, No. 11 AC-CC00553, 2011 WL 4425537 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Sept.
23, 2011). In Lee County, Florida, school authorities instructed teachers that they should
not "friend" students. Bob Sullivan, Teachers, Students and Facebook, a Toxic Mix, THE

RED TAPE CHRONICLES (Oct. 22, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://redtape.msnbc.msn.com/_news/
2010/10/22/6345537-teachers-students-and-facebook-a-toxic-mix (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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